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1 Introduction
Many dynamic contests feature multi-stage intragroup elimination procedures. Examples of
such contests in sports include Formula 1 qualifying, where only the quickest drivers qualify
for later qualification rounds, elimination races in track cycling where the slowest riders are
eliminated in each round or athletics, where only the fastest runners qualify for the trials
and the fastest runners in the trials qualify for World Championships or Olympic Games.
The scope of such contests reaches beyond applications in sports. For instance, consider
scholarship applications where, in a first round, applicants submit a letter of motivation.
Based on these letters, a subset of applicants is selected for the second round. The sec-
ond round might be an assessment seminar, where the applicants can meet their peers and
establish industry contacts. After the assessment seminar, the best applicants receive a schol-
arship.1 Other applications with similar features include runoff elections and different TV
formats with popular voting (e.g., American Idol, Big Brother, Let’s Dance, The Bachelor).
In these applications, all remaining contestants compete with each other in each round.
The best-performing contestants qualify for the next round, while the remaining contestants
are eliminated from the game. Additionally, some of the qualifying contestants may also
receive an intermediate prize in the given round. For example, think of an additional prize
awarded to the winner of a round in elimination races.
Such contest have for instance been studied in a Tullock lottery framework by Fu and Lu
(2012) and Arve and Chiappinelli (2018) and for contests with noise by Altmann, Falk, and
Wibral (2012) and Delfgaauw, Dur, Non, and Verbeke (2015).2 Our analysis differs in two
aspects from these papers. First, in each stage an all-pay auction with complete information
is played.
1Such a scheme is used by the German National Academic Foundation.
2The framework differs from elimination contests in which the set of contestants is split into subcontests
in each round; see, e.g., Rosen (1986), Moldovanu and Sela (2006), and Groh, Moldovanu, Sela, and Sunde
(2012). In those models, the winners of the subcontests compete against each other in later rounds. As an
application, think of a tennis tournaments where pairs of players compete in a knock-out format in each
round.
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Much more importantly, all of the mentioned papers avoid the analysis of a major effect:
the expected gain from qualification for later rounds might depend on the identity of the other
qualifiers. For instance, in athletics, it is easier to win a gold medal if a top contender did not
qualify for the final. This problem disappears in the previous literature as contestants are
either assumed to be symmetric or identity-dependent differences do not carry over to future
rounds. In this paper, we explore if and how this additional factor influences equilibrium
behavior.
The equilibrium analysis is ordered in decreasing level of generality. Proposition 2 derives
conditions such that behavior is unaffected by the incentives to qualify, i.e., in the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium of the static multi-prize all-pay auction
found in Clark and Riis (1998) is played among the qualified players in every round. These
conditions are (i) there are fewer qualification spots than prizes in each round (except for
the last), (ii) the order of valuations is constant across players and rounds and (iii) either
the sequence of prizes is decreasing or a specific tie-breaking is used.
If at least one of the three conditions fails, behavior might be affected by the extra
incentive to qualify. In particular, if the first condition fails behavior is always affected by
expected future gains. We split these gains up into two parts. First, there is a qualification
payoff, i.e., the future expected payoff when the strongest contestants qualify. The second
effect is more subtle. The externality payoff reflects the well-known hope of a sportsman
that strong rivals are eliminated along the way in order to have an easier final.
In contrast to the literature, the externality payoff depends on the own effort in the cur-
rent period, as this changes the expected composition of rivals in later rounds conditional
on qualification. Moreover, in equilibrium, it may also depend on the chance of elimination
of each rival in one of the future rounds. This makes it difficult to derive a general char-
acterization result for contests with equally many qualification spots and prizes in multiple
periods.
Thus, in the second part of the paper, we focus on contests with two rounds, two prizes in
Round 1 and two qualification spots. In Round 2, the two remaining players compete for a
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single prize. We provide a closed-form characterization of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in
Proposition 3. We then further restrict attention to two polar situations where two players
have the same valuation. This approach allows us to disentangle effects of externality payoffs
and qualification payoffs, as in each case one of the two vanishes. Moreover, we provide
uniqueness results for this setting and we use it for our comparisons to other models.
As a first benchmark for comparison, we consider a static contest in which, as in the two-
stage contest, the winner receives two prizes and the contestant with the second highest effort
gets one prize. We show that the dynamic model yields a higher expected effort. As a second
benchmark, we compare our results to a version in which the second round is not announced
ex-ante by the contest designer. For this case, we identify when the externality payoff yields
an extra motivation in terms of expected effort. We see our results as a first indication that
extra incentives through the newly explored externality payoffs are an explanation for the
popularity of the studied class of contests.
The first part of this paper is closely related to the classic literature on static all-pay
auctions. Inspired by the pioneering work by Hillman and Samet (1987) and Hillman and
Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) provided a complete characterization
of equilibria in the complete-information all-pay auction with one prize. Under a weak
genericity condition, their characterization was extended to all-pay auctions with multiple
identical prizes in Clark and Riis (1998) and even more general all-pay contests with multiple
identical prizes in Siegel (2009).
The second part of the paper relates to the recent literature on identity-dependent ex-
ternalities in all-pay auctions with a single prize; see Konrad (2006), Klose and Kovenock
(2015a) and Klose and Kovenock (2015b). In these papers, if an agent does not win a prize,
his utility depends on the identity of the winner. For example, in a political campaign, the
utility of a losing party might depend on its ideological difference to the winner. In our
paper, however, the payoff of a player in a given round does not depend the identities of
the (other) winners. Instead, the effort decision influences the composition of the rivals in
future rounds, and thereby the expected future payoff. Thus, the size of the externality
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is endogenously determined. Moreover, the externality effect in our paper depends on the
entire set of qualifiers and not only on the winner.
Finally, our model is related to literature on multi-stage contests/races (see, e.g., Harris
and Vickers, 1987, and with the all-pay auction as a stage game, Konrad and Kovenock,
2009). As a main difference to a race, the set of players shrinks over time in our model.
Moreover, races do not have a fixed time horizon, but end once a player reaches a certain
target or decides to stop.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In Sections 3 and 4, we present
the main characterization results. Section 5 compares our results to two benchmark models.
Section 6 discusses our findings. The proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a model with n > 2 risk-neutral contestants i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} = I and T > 1
rounds t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. All n contestants are qualified for Round 1. We denote the set of
contestants which are qualified for Round t by Qt−1. Note that Q0 = I. Furthermore, denote
the number of bidders qualified for Round t by qt−1 = |Qt−1|. At time t, each contestant
has complete information about the entire history of bids/eliminations up to time t.3 Each
qualified contestant i ∈ Qt−1 chooses his bid xit in Round t at a cost of c(xit) = xit.4 This
yields a vector of bids xt = (xit)i∈Qt−1 .
If all bids are of different size, we say that the player with the highest bid has bid rank
1, the player with the second highest bid has bid rank 2 and so forth. In Round t, the qt
bidders with the lowest bid ranks qualify for Round t + 1. The mt ≤ qt players with the
lowest bid ranks in Round t additionally receive a prize, where mt ≥ 0. To rule out trivial
cases where nothing is at stake in the final round, we require mT ≥ 1 and mT < qT−1.
3The equilibrium strategies depend only on the identities of the other qualifiers. Hence, our results would
also hold when only the identities of the qualifiers and their valuations are observable.
4As is well-known in this literature, the valuation-cost ratio determines the effort levels. We thus nor-
malize individual marginal costs to one and consider the differences only in the valuations. Our equilibrium
characterization directly extends to asymmetric, yet constant marginal costs.
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The qt−1 − qt ≥ 0 players with the highest bid ranks are eliminated. Thus, the vector
xt splits the players into three mutually exclusive sets: (i) players who receive a prize and
qualify for the next round, (ii) players who do not receive a prize and qualify for the next
round and (iii) players who do not receive a prize and are eliminated, i.e., do not qualify
for the next round. Each stage has at least two contestants, i.e., qT−1 ≥ 2. We employ the
convention qT = qT−1.
If at least two players bid the same amount, a tie-breaking rule specifies the bid rank
among players involved in a tie. We now define one possible tie-breaking rule. The only
result in the paper that depends on this specification is Part (1) of Proposition 2. Part (2)
of Proposition 2 contains a general result for arbitrary tie-breaking rules. The bid rank of
player i in Round t is given by
rit(xt) = |j ∈ Qt−1 : xjt > xit|+ |j ∈ Qt−1 : xjt = xit and j ≤ i|. (1)
The second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (1) is at least 1 due to the case j = i. Note
that Eq. (1) formalizes the previous description when all bids are of different size. Moreover,
it entails that ties are broken in favor of players with lower subscripts.
Valuations for a prize in Round t are denoted by vit, where vit = 0 if mt = 0 and vit > 0
otherwise for all i and t. For each player i, his (mixed) strategy specifies a cumulative
distribution (cdf) Fit over his bids for every history such that player i is qualified for Round
t. A player is called active in Round t if he is qualified for Round t and Fit(0) 6= 1. Given
the distributions of the other players, the (expected) payoff of a qualified player in Round t
who bids xit is piit(xit) = vitP[{rit(xt) ≤ mt} | xit]−xit. If player i did not qualify for Round
t, piit = 0. Each player maximizes his expected payoff pii = E[
∑T
t=1 piit].
3 General Results
In several applications, all players who qualify for the next round receive a prize. For
instance, all participants gain some marketing revenues and/or derive intrinsic utility from
the mere qualification for a World Championship or Olympic Games. In this example,
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different valuations might reflect differences in the marketability of the athlete or different
effort costs. In other applications, however, there are fewer prizes than qualification spots,
e.g., when only the winner of a preliminary round receives an additional intermediate prize.
We shall see that this distinction has a qualitative impact on the equilibrium characterization.
We first recall the well-known result for static all-pay auctions with different valuations
and m identical prizes by Clark and Riis (1998) and adapt it to our notation.
Lemma 1 (Proposition 1 in Clark and Riis, 1998). Consider a static all-pay auction with
m < n identical prizes and let the valuations be ordered by v1 > v2 > . . . > vn. There exists
a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game in which only the bidders with the
m + 1 highest valuations are active. These players randomize according to the probability
distributions Fi(x) over [xi, vm+1] with common upper support x¯i = x¯ = vm+1 and lower
supports given by xm+1 = 0 and xi = [1−
∏m
j=i(
vj
vi
)]vm+1 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and where
Fi(x) = 1− vi∏m
j=k v
1
m+1−k
j
(1− x
vm+1
)
1
m+1−k
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m where k = 1 if x1 ≤ x ≤ vm+1, k = s if xs ≤ x < xs−1 s = 2, 3, . . . ,m and
Fm+1(x) = 1− vm+1
vm
+
vm+1
vm
(1− vm∏m
j=k v
1
m+1−k
j
(1− x
vm+1
)
1
m+1−k ).
The expected net surplus of an active player i is vi − vm+1.
For the rest of this section, we impose that the ordering of players in terms of “strength”,
e.g., cost-efficiency or ability, is the same across periods.
Assumption 1 (Constant Valuation Order Condition). The valuations satisfy v1t > v2t >
v3t > . . . > vnt for all t such that mt > 0.
To state the first main result, we need some additional notation. Recall that |Qt−1| =
qt−1. Define the set Q˜t−1 = {1, 2, . . . , qt−1} and the function gt : Qt−1 → Q˜t−1 such that
gt(i) = |j ∈ Qt−1 : j ≤ i|. Thus, the set Q˜t−1 is a relabeling of the qualified players ordered
by their valuations.
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Proposition 2. (1) Suppose mt < qt for all t < T and ties are broken as specified in Section
2. The contest has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. For any given set of qualified
players Qt−1, equilibrium behavior in Round t is described as follows. If mt > 0, equilibrium
behavior is given by the construction obtained in Clark and Riis (1998), where qt−1 is the
number of players, mt is the number of prizes and the valuations satisfy vgt(i) = vit for all
i ∈ Qt−1. If mt = 0, every player i ∈ Qt−1 bids zero with probability 1.
(2) Suppose mt < qt for all t < T and mt is decreasing in t. Then the result in Part (1)
extends to arbitrary tie-breaking rules.
(3) Suppose ms = qs for at least one round s < T . Then there exists no subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which behavior in all such rounds is given by the construction obtained in
Clark and Riis (1998).
Note that in the equilibrium of Clark and Riis (1998) only the players with mt + 1 ≤ qt
highest valuations are active. Thus, due to the relative scarcity of prizes, only the “strongest”
contestants find it valuable to compete. In (1) and (2), this means that no strong contestant
runs the risk of elimination. Thus, a contest with more qualification spots than prizes
provides no extra incentives from qualification.
The assumptions for Parts (1) and (2) are quite restrictive. To recap, we need that (i)
the number of qualification spots exceeds the number of prizes, (ii) valuations are ordered
in a constant way across periods, and (iii) the prize sequence is decreasing or a special tie-
breaking rule is used. For instance, in a sports competition, the qualification to a World
Championship or Olympiad is a “prize” given to each qualifying athlete. In this case, a
strong athlete has an extra incentive from qualification based on the fact that strong rivals
might not qualify which is not taken into account in the one-shot model.
Thus, it seems interesting to study how equilibrium behavior changes if the previous
assumptions are not met. For the general model, it is hard to quantify the extra incentive
from qualification, as it does not only depend on whether a player qualifies, but also on the
other qualifiers: the expected future payoff of a contestant might increase when the other
qualifiers are weaker than expected. We analyze a tractable two-period version in Section 4.
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Before doing so, let us briefly elaborate on two extensions of Proposition 2.
Discounting: The proof of Proposition 2 does not use the relative importance of a particular
round. Thus, it directly extends to cases in which payoffs in each Round t are discounted at
an arbitrary common discount rate δt > 0.
General Cost Functions: The first two parts of Proposition 2 can be extended to more
general, non-linear cost functions. A sufficient condition is that the valuation-cost ratio is
ordered in the same way for each round and for every bid, an extension of our valuation order
condition. Siegel (2009) provides an even weaker condition on the valuation-cost ratios in
his Theorem 2. Together with the requirement that the ratios are ordered identically across
rounds, it is also sufficient for the first two parts of Proposition 2 to hold.
4 Two-Period Model
We now relax the assumption of more qualification spots than prizes. This is natural for
our example of qualifying for the Olympic Games, where each qualification spot is perceived
as a prize and can generate additional marketing revenues. In that example, in line with
our constant valuation order condition, ability advantages are likely to persist across rounds
and the prize sequence might well be decreasing. However, note that we could also relax the
other assumptions needed for Proposition 2 (1) and (2) and we would obtain similar effects.
As we have seen in the previous section, when there are equally many qualification spots
and prizes, some players have extra incentives from qualification for the next round. In this
section, we quantify these extra incentives. We henceforth restrict attention to two round
contests with two qualification spots and three heterogeneous prizes, two in the first round
and one in the second round.
4.1 Three Different Valuations
Consider n > 3 contestants with valuations v1 = v11 = v12 ≥ v2 = v21 = v22 ≥ . . . ≥ vn =
vn1 = vn2 > 0 and q1 = 2, m1 = 2,m2 = 1. In words, there are three homogeneous prizes
(two in Round 1 and one in Round 2) and two players qualify for Round 2.
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For the two qualifiers, equilibrium play in Round 2 is given by the equilibrium of an all-
pay auction with asymmetric valuations (see Hillman and Riley, 1989 - the predecessor to
Clark and Riis, 1998 for only one prize). The expected equilibrium payoffs are the difference
in valuations for the stronger player and zero for the weaker player. To determine the
subgame-perfect equilibrium, we now focus on Round 1. For notational convenience, we
henceforth omit the time subscript for Round 1 in the notation of F, x and v.
If we suppose that only the three players with the highest valuations are active and that
the cdf’s are continuous, we can write the expected payoff of player 1 as
pi1(x) = v1(F2(x) + F3(x)− F2(x)F3(x))− x+
(v1 − v2)(F2(x) + F3(x)− F2(x)F3(x)) + (v2 − v3)(F2(x)(1− F3(x)) +
∫ x
0
f3(z)F2(z)dz).
The first line of the above equation represents the expected payoff of player 1 in Round
1. It is given by her valuation times the probability that she does not have the lowest bid in
the first round minus the cost of the bid. The second line expresses the expected payoff in
Round 2. The first term is the qualification payoff which gives the direct value of the own
qualification. It is given by the qualification probability times the expected payoff (v1 − v2)
of competing against player 2 in a one-shot all-pay auction (Round 2). The last term gives
externality payoff which is the expected additional payoff from the chance that player 2 is
eliminated and player 1 can compete against player 3 in Round 2.
For player 2, the qualification payoff is zero, as if she qualifies with player 1, she gets no
additional expected payoff in Round 2. Thus, we obtain
pi2(x) = v2(F1(x) +F3(x)−F1(x)F3(x))−x+ (v2− v3)(F1(x)(1−F3(x)) +
∫ x
0
f3(z)F1(z)dz).
Finally, for player 3, the qualification payoff and the externality payoff are both zero, as
he receives an expected payoff of zero in Round 2 against both possible opponents, i.e.,
pi3(x) = v3(F1(x) + F2(x)− F1(x)F2(x))− x.
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Before we construct the equilibrium in special cases, we first provide our general charac-
terization result:5
Proposition 3. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the distribution functions in Round 1
are given by
F1(x) =

0 for x < a
1− (1− x
v3
)
1
2 (1− a
v3
)−
1
2 for x ∈ [a, v3]
1 for x > v3 ,
F2(x) =

x
v3
for x < a
1− (1− a
v3
)
1
2 (1− x
v3
)
1
2 for x ∈ [a, v3]
1 for x > v3 ,
and
F3(x) =

b+ x
v2
for x < a
1− (1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−
1
2 (1− x
v3
)
1
2 for x ∈ [a, v3]
1 for x > v3 ,
where a = 4v3(v1−v2)
4v1−v2−v3 and b =
(v2−v3)(4v1−v2)
v2(4v1−v2−v3) .
All other players bid 0 with probability 1. Among the qualified contestants, the distri-
bution functions in Round 2 are as given in Hillman and Riley (1989).
We now consider the two limiting cases where two valuations are equal. This enables
us to separate effects induced by the qualification payoff and by the externality payoff. In
addition, we provide more insights into the equilibrium construction and uniqueness.
5We are not aware of the existence of another subgame-perfect equilibrium. However, as in the setting of
Klose and Kovenock (2015a), general uniqueness results are difficult to obtain due to the externalities.
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4.2 Two Strong Players and One Weak Player
In the first case, valuations are v1 = v11 = v12 = v2 = v21 = v22 > v3 = v31 = v32 > 0
and q1 = 2, m1 = 2,m2 = 1. Hence, two players with equal valuations compete with one
“weaker” player. As before, the two qualified players play the one-shot equilibrium of an
all-pay auction in Round 2. It remains to analyze the first round.
Define the left endpoint of the support of the cdf of player i by xi = {inf x : Fi(x) > 0}
and the left endpoint of the support of the joint cdf by x = mini{xi}. Analogously, for the
right endpoint, define x¯i = {supx : Fi(x) < 1} and x¯ = maxi{x¯i}. In this subsection, we
focus on equilibria in the following class of strategy profiles.
Definition 1. A strategy profile is symmetric if F1 = F2. A strategy profile is monotone if
for all i, Fi(x) has a strictly positive density on (xi, x¯i).
Symmetric and monotone equilibria are a natural subclass of equilibria. Symmetry re-
quires that ex-ante identical contestants behave in the same way. Monotonicity mainly
requires that there are no “holes” in the support of a cdf. In a model with vanishing pertur-
bations in mapping effort to output, Seel and Strack (2016) show that any cdf has to satisfy
this property.
By a standard undercutting argument, each distribution function Fi is continuous on
(xi, x¯i). The following lemma is also similar to well-known results in the related literature
on all-pay auctions.
Lemma 4. The endpoints are given by x1 = x2 = x3 = 0 and x¯1 = x¯2 = x¯3 = v3. Moreover,
we have F1(0) = F2(0) = 0 and pi3 = 0.
By monotonicity, each player is indifferent between any bid in (0, x¯). Since the cdf’s are
continuous, the payoff of player 3 on (0, x¯) can be written as
pi3(x) = v3(F1(x) + F2(x)− F1(x)F2(x))− x = 0. (2)
Imposing symmetry in Eq. (2) and rearranging, we obtain
F1(x) = F2(x) = 1−
√
1− x
v3
.
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The payoff of player 1 on (0, x¯) can be written as
pi1(x) = v1(F2(x) +F3(x)−F2(x)F3(x))−x+ (v1− v3)(F2(x)(1−F3(x)) +
∫ x
0
f3(z)F2(z)dz).
As in the general case, the first two terms represent the expected payoff of player 1 in
Round 1. However, the qualification payoff is now zero as player 1 does not get a positive
payoff if she qualifies to Round 2 with an equally strong player. Thus, we only have the
externality payoff for Round 2.
Plugging in for F2(x) and taking the derivative, we obtain the condition under which
player 1 is indifferent between her bids as the differential equation
v1(1− x
v3
)f3(x) =
2v1 − v3
2v3
F3(x) +
√
1− x
v3
− 2v1 − v3
2v3
subject to the boundary condition F3(v3) = 1.
The solution is given by
F3(x) = 1−
2v3
√
1− x
v3
3v1 − v3 .
Note that we obtain the same equilibrium distribution as in the limit when v2 approaches
v1 in the general case. The following proposition sums up the previous findings.
Proposition 5. The game has a unique symmetric and monotone subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium, the distribution functions for the bids in Round 1 are
F1(x) = F2(x) =
1− (1−
x
v3
)
1
2 for x ∈ [0, v3]
1 for x > v3 ,
F3(x) =
1−
2v3(1− xv3 )
1
2
3v1−v3 for x ∈ [0, v3]
1 for x > v3 ,
Among the qualified contestants, the distribution functions in Round 2 are as given in
Hillman and Riley (1989).
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Figure 1 Both panels show the bid of player 1 in Round 1 on the x-axis and her profit on the y-axis
for valuations v1 = v2 = 3 and v3 = 2. The left panel shows the expected profit per round. The
right panel shows her expected externality payoff in Round 2 conditional on qualification with a
given bid in Round 1.
The expected profit of player 1 is displayed for both rounds in the left panel of Figure 1.
The total profit is constant as, in equilibrium, player 1 randomizes her bids over the entire
interval. Her expected payoff in the first round, however, is higher at lower effort levels.
Intuitively, as the effort approaches zero, if she qualifies, she will almost always face player 2
in Round 2. In this case, she receives no additional payoff in Round 2, i.e., her qualification
payoff is zero. On the other hand, for higher bids, the probability of qualifying for Round
2 together with player 3, i.e., her externality payoff, increases. This increase is offset by a
lower expected payoff in Round 1.
The right panel illustrates the payoff of player 1 in Round 2 for a given bid in Round 1
conditional on qualifying for Round 2 with that bid. Again, we can see that a higher bid in
Round 1 leads to a higher externality payoff caused by an increased likelihood of qualifying
together with player 3.
4.3 Two Weak Players and One Strong Player
The next example deals with 3 contestants with valuations v1 = v11 = v12 > v2 = v21 =
v22 = v3 = v31 = v32 > 0 and q1 = 2, m1 = 2,m2 = 1. Thus, there is only one “strong”
player and two “weak” players.
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Among the two qualified contestants, equilibrium play in Round 2 is given by the equi-
librium in Hillman and Riley (1989). In particular, note that the expected payoff in Round
2 is zero for players 2 and 3 independent of the identity of their rival. The expected payoff
of player 1 is v1 − v3 in Round 2, again independent of the identity of the rival. Note that
this means, that all externality payoffs are zero and the qualification payoff for player 1 is
maximal.6
The payoffs in the first round are equivalent to those in a static game with two prizes and
valuations 2v1 − v3 for the strong player and v3 for the weak players. The equilibrium can
be obtained by plugging these valuations in the equilibrium found in Clark and Riis (1998).
After some rearranging, we obtain:
Proposition 6. In the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, the distribution functions in
Round 1 are given by
F1(x) =

0 for x < v3(1− v32v1−v3 )
1− (1− x
v3
)
1
2 (2v1−v3
v3
)
1
2 for x ∈ [v3(1− v32v1−v3 ), v3]
1 for x > v3 ,
and
F2(x) = F3(x) =

x
v3
for x < v3(1− v32v1−v3 )
1− (1− x
v3
)
1
2 ( v3
2v1−v3 )
1
2 for x ∈ [v3(1− v32v1−v3 ), v3]
1 for x > v3 .
Among the qualified contestants, the distribution functions in Round 2 are as given in
Hillman and Riley (1989).
6The existence of an externality payoff is linked to the heterogeneity of the contestants. In particular,
Assumption 1 does not hold in this section as v2 = v3.
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5 Comparisons to Related Contests
In the previous section, we derived equilibria for cases in which the winner of Round 2 collects
2 identical prizes, the loser of Round 2 receives 1 prize and the player who is eliminated in
Round 1 receives no prize.
5.1 Static Contest
The corresponding static model is a multi-prize all-pay auction with prize 2vi for the highest
bidder and vi for the second highest bidder. As before, players are ordered by their valuation,
i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3. In the appendix, we verify the conditions for applicability of the algorithm
in Xiao (2016) and use it to derive the unique equilibrium of the static model. Then, we
compare the induced effort levels in both contests. We focus on the polar cases with two equal
valuations, as these yield a unique (symmetric and monotone) equilibrium in the two-stage
contest and are thus suitable for comparative statics.
Proposition 7. For both cases (v1 > v2 = v3 and v1 = v2 > v3), the total expected effort
in the two-stage contest is higher than in the static contest.
The intuition for Proposition 7 differs for the two cases. In the case of two strong
contestants and one weak contestant (see Figure 2), the static contest might yield very low
effort provision if valuations differ drastically. In particular, there are cases where the third
player remains inactive and the other two contestants essentially compete over one prize as
they are guaranteed second place. Instead, they compete for two prizes in Round 1 of the
two-stage intragroup elimination contest and all three players are active.
For two weak contestants and one strong contestant, player 1 is additionally motivated
by the qualification payoff. Thus, in the two-stage contest, player 1 exerts relatively more
effort. In turn, this leads to a higher total equilibrium effort.
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Figure 2 The x-axis depicts the fraction of valuations v3v1 and the y-axis the total effort normalized
by v1. The solid line depicts the expected total effort in the two-stage contest and the dotted line
the expected total effort in the static game in the case v1 = v2 > v3.
5.2 No Announcement of Second Round
In many applications, a designer knows whether she will host a similar contest in the future.
If so, she has the option to reveal it and announce that the best performers will be invited
again or to keep this information private. We assume that contestants do not anticipate
further rounds if the designer does not announce them.7 Then the question becomes: Should
the designer announce future rounds?
Without announcement, the equilibria in Clark and Riis (1998) will be played, with three
players and two prizes in Round 1, and two players and one prize in Round 2. We provide
the details in the appendix. The next result compares the two informational assumptions.
Proposition 8. Announcing the second round
(i) increases expected effort if and only if v3 <
√
17−3
2
v1 for v1 = v2 > v3,
(ii) increases expected effort if and only if v3 < (2− (9−
√
78)
1
3
3
2
3
− 1
(27−3√78) 13
)v1 for v1 > v2 = v3,
(iii) increases the chance that a contestant with the highest valuation wins Round 2 for
v1 = v2 > v3 and v1 > v2 = v3.
7The less extreme case where the designer can only influence the belief that another round follows leads
to qualitatively similar results.
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The cutoff values in (i) and (ii) are close to v3 = 0.5v1. Announcing is better in terms of
expected effort when there is more dispersion in variations. Let us provide some intuition
for the underlying effects. When Round 2 is announced, the stronger players have more to
gain in Round 1, which explains (iii). For valuations as given in (ii), total expected effort in
Round 1 increases. However, the chance that player 1 qualifies also increases, which reduces
expected effort in Round 2 by the exclusion principle (Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993).
For valuations as given in (i), when Round 2 is announced, player 3 reduces her effort in
Round 1. In turn, more effort is spent in Round 2, as the case in which players 1 and 2
qualify is more likely to occur.
6 Discussion
The main novelty of our analysis has been the focus on the externality payoff, that is the gain
by the possibility that strong rivals are eliminated along the way. The first part of the paper
has derived sufficient conditions under which an externality payoff has no effect: each round
has more qualification spots than prizes, the order of valuation is constant across rounds,
and the number of prizes is decreasing.
These assumptions appear to be rather restrictive. Hence, a better understanding of
externality payoffs seems important. For analytical tractability, we have focused on cases
with two rounds and equal qualification spots and prizes in the first round. For this setting
we have been able to obtain closed-form solutions. The expected payoff of qualifying for the
second round can be disentangled into the qualification payoff and the externality payoff. The
qualification payoff describes the payoff of qualifying with the best competitors. We have
analyzed the extreme cases, where only one of the two payoffs is present, and shown that the
externality payoff vastly influences equilibrium behavior already in this simple environment.
The comparative statics for these cases might be seen as a first indication why such
contests are frequently observed in the real world. We hope to inspire future research on
externality payoffs within and beyond the current model framework.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: We start with Part (1). Existence: Define Q˜bt−1 = {1, 2, . . . , b} ⊆
Q˜t−1, i.e., b ≤ qt−1. Note that by the equilibrium construction in Clark and Riis (1998),
only players i such that gt(i) ∈ Q˜mt+1t−1 are active in Round t. Since qt > mt or equivalently
qt ≥ mt + 1, in our equilibrium candidate, player i qualifies for Round t + 1 if and only
if gt(i) ∈ Q˜qtt−1 (recall that ties of players who bid zero are resolved according to their
subscripts).
First consider a deviation by a player i such that gt(i) ∈ Q˜qtt−1. For any deviation, the
other qualifying players and their strategies in the remaining rounds stay the same, i.e.,
player i’s payoff in later rounds is unchanged. By Lemma 1, player i cannot increase his
payoff in Round t. Thus, no player i such that gt(i) ∈ Q˜qtt−1 has an incentive to deviate in
Round t.
Now consider a deviation by a player i such that gt(i) ∈ Q˜t−1 \ Q˜qtt−1 in Round t. By
optimality in the one-shot game, any deviation of player i yields a (weakly) negative payoff
in Round t. Moreover, in case of qualification for Round s > t, player i has the lowest
subscript in Round s by the constant valuation order condition (Assumption 1). Thus, by
the equilibrium construction, player i makes at most zero payoff in any Round s > t since
ms < qs. Thus, player i has no incentive to deviate in Round t. Thus, no player has
an incentive to deviate in any round t, i.e., the strategy profile from the proposition is a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Uniqueness: Towards a contradiction, suppose there exists another subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Then, there exists a maximal round t¯ such that the equilibrium cdf’s differ
from the ones in Clark and Riis (1998) in some subgame starting in Round t¯, but are
identical to those in the proposition in all subgames starting in any Round t > t¯. Consider
a subgame starting in Round t¯ in which cdf’s differ from the ones in the proposition.
Case 1: Suppose no player i such that ft¯(i) ∈ Q˜t¯−1 \ Q˜qtt¯−1 is active in Round t¯. Then
only the players i such that ft¯(i) ∈ Q˜qtt¯−1 qualify for the next round. If one of these players
deviates in Round t¯, the qualifiers for t¯ + 1 and future equilibrium behavior is unchanged.
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Thus, only incentives in Round t¯ matter for the profitability of a deviation of one of these
players. Since the strategy profile is not the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game
by assumption, there exists a profitable deviation of a player i in Round t¯, which yields a
contradiction to optimality.
Case 2: Complementing Case 1, suppose at least one player i such that ft¯(i) ∈ Q˜t¯−1\Q˜qtt¯−1
is active in Round t¯. Let h be the active player with the highest subscript. Note that in
every Round t > t¯, if player h qualifies, he is the remaining player with the lowest valuation
by Assumption 1. Since mt < qt, by the construction in Clark and Riis (1998)—which holds
for all t > t¯ by assumption—player h receives an expected payoff of 0 in all Rounds t > t¯.
Thus, by optimality, piht¯(x) ≥ 0 for all x in the support of his cdf in Round t¯. In particular,
the inequality has to hold at the supremum x¯ht¯ of his support. Note that piht¯(x¯ht¯) ≥ 0
implies pijt¯(x¯ht¯) > 0 for all j < h such that j ∈ Qt−1. Recall that a player can guarantee a
payoff of zero in each round by bidding zero. Thus, the expected continuation payoff satisfies
E[
∑T
t¯ pijt] > 0 for all j < h such that j ∈ Qt−1. We again split up the rest of the argument
into two cases.
Case 2.1: Suppose Fh(0) = 0. If Fj(0) > 0 for at least one player j < h, out of these
players, the one with the highest subscript would be eliminated with probability 1 when
bidding zero. This contradicts optimality, as the expected continuation payoff should be
strictly positive. Thus, Fj(0) = 0 for all j < h such that j ∈ Qt−1.
Define the infimum of the support of the active players by xt¯ = inf{x : ∃i s.t. gt(i) ≤
gt(h) and Fi(x) > 0}. If Fi(xt¯) > 0 for at least one player i such that gt(i) ≤ gt(h), the
player with the highest subscript among them is strictly worse off by bidding xt¯ compared to
bidding zero which contradicts optimality. Otherwise, the qualification probability is zero for
each player who bids xt¯. As the continuation payoff is bounded and the winning probability
is continuous at xt¯ in this case, there exists an -interval such that expected continuation
payoffs of bidding x ∈ [xt¯, xt¯+) is negative for each player, thereby contradicting optimality.
Case 2.2: Suppose 0 < Fh(0) < 1. Suppose at least one player j < h has Fj(0) > 0 and
call the player with the highest subscript among them player l. By optimality of bidding
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zero, the continuation payoff of player l is strictly positive. He never wins a prize in Round
t¯ by bidding 0 and he can only qualify if only player h is eliminated. In this case, his
expected payoff in each round t ∈ {t¯+ 1, t¯+ 2, . . . , T} is weakly lower than if any other rival
is eliminated in Round t¯ by the construction in Clark and Riis (1998). Note that player h is
indifferent between 0 and the supremum of his bids x¯ht¯ . Thus, player l increases his payoff in
Round t¯ by deviating from 0 to x¯ht¯ and his expected payoff in rounds t ∈ {t¯+ 1, t¯+ 2, . . . , T}
also increases weakly. This contradicts optimality of bidding zero.
Thus, Fj(0) = 0 for all qualified players j < h. Since their expected payoffs are continuous
at 0, there exists an  > 0 such that Fj(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, ). Extending the definition
in Case 2.1, we define the infimum over the positive bids as xt¯ = inf{x : ∃i s.t. gt(i) <
gt(h) and Fi(x) > 0 or Fh(x) > Fh(0)}. Thus, the qualification probability and the set of
qualifiers is constant if a player j < h bids on [0, xt¯). Thus, as in Case 2.1., if at least one
player bids xt¯ with positive probability, one of these players does not improve his winning
probability in Round xt¯ compared to a bid of zero. Moreover, the set of qualifiers remains
the same which is a contradiction to optimality of bidding xt¯. If no bidder bids xt¯ with
positive probability, there is an -interval such that expected continuation payoffs of bidding
x ∈ [xt¯, xt¯ + ) is weakly below the expected continuation payoff of bidding zero for each
player, thereby contradicting optimality.
Part (2): Note that on the equilibrium path, the strongest mt contestants qualify with
probability one for the next round. Unlike in Part (1), however, the remaining qualifiers
(who all bid 0 in Round t) depend on the tie-breaking rule. We can then make a similar
case distinction for a possible deviation, but now have to consider players who qualify with
probability 1 and players who do not qualify with probability 1. For the former group, the
proof stays the same. For the latter group (players who do not qualify with probability 1),
by the assumption that mt is decreasing, the behavior of the rivals in future rounds if a
different weak contestant qualifies. Thus, such a player cannot make a profit in any future
Round and therefore has no incentive to deviate in Round t.
It remains to prove Part (3).
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Consider a subgame starting at a Round s such that ms = qs and mt < qt for all t > s.
Note that s < T since mT < qT . Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists a
subgame-perfect equilibrium with behavior in Round s described by Clark and Riis (1998).
By the proof of (1), from Round s+ 1 onwards, equilibrium play is given by Clark and Riis
(1998). The payoff of the qualified player with the lowest subscript in Period s is constant
for all her bids.
Compare two bids in her support in Period s. If she qualifies for Period s+ 1 with both
bids, her payoff in the remaining rounds is the same. If she qualifies only with the higher
bid, she has a positive payoff in the remaining rounds if and only if she chooses the higher
bid.
Thus, with a higher bid she makes a higher expected payoff in future rounds and the same
expected payoff in the current round s, thereby contradicting optimality of the randomization
in Clark and Riis (1998) for the subgame starting in Period s.
Proof of Proposition 3. We have to show that, given the other player’s cdf’s, the payoffs are
constant on [0, v3] for players 2 and 3. Moreover, for player 1, the payoff has to be constant
on x ∈ [a, v3] and (weakly) lower for x < a and the payoff of the remaining players cannot
be positive for x > 0. Note that the payoffs of the active players are given by:
pi1(x) = (2v1−v2)(F2(x)+F3(x)−F2(x)F3(x))−x+(v2−v3)(F2(x)(1−F3(x))+
∫ x
0
f3(z)F2(z)dz).
pi2(x) = v2(F1(x) +F3(x)−F1(x)F3(x))−x+ (v2− v3)(F1(x)(1−F3(x)) +
∫ x
0
f3(z)F1(z)dz).
pi3(x) = v3(F1(x) + F2(x)− F1(x)F2(x))− x.
We first consider the case x ∈ [a, v3] and we plug the distribution functions into the
payoffs. We start with player 2 to obtain
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pi2(x) = v2(1− (1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−1(1− x
v3
))− x+ (v2 − v3)((1− (1− a
v3
)−
1
2
(1− x
v3
)
1
2 )((1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−
1
2 (1− x
v3
)
1
2 ) +
∫ x
0
1
2v3
(1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−
1
2
(1− z
v3
)−
1
2 (1− (1− a
v3
)−
1
2 (1− z
v3
)
1
2dz
Further simplification yields
pi2(x) = v2(1− (1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−1(1− x
v3
))− x
+(v2 − v3)(−(1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−1(1− x
v3
)− x
2v3
(1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−1 + (1− b− a
v2
) +
a
2v3
(1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−1).
Note that the following relations hold:
(1− b− a
v2
) = − 2v3
v3 + v2 − 4v1 and (1−
a
v3
)−1 =
v3 + v2 − 4v1
v3 − 3v2 .
Consider only terms that involve an x in the expression for pi2(x) to get
−x+ v2
v3
x(1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−1 + (v2 − v3)(1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−1
x
2v3
.
Note that x vanishes from the expression above by plugging in the two identities from before.
We get the following remainder:
pi2(x) = v2(1 +
2v3
v3 − 3v2 ) + (v2 − v3)(
2v3
v3 − 3v2 −
2v3
v2 + v3 − 4v1 −
a
v3 − v2 ).
Upon simplification, we arrive at the final expression
pi2(x) =
(v2 − v3)(v2 − 4v1)
(v3 + v2 − 4v1) .
Similarly, we can consider Player 1 and plug F2 and F3 into the expression for player 1’s
payoff:
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(2v1 − v2)(1− (1− b− a
v2
)(1− x
v3
))− x+ (v2 − v3)
(
1
2
a2
v2v3
+
∫ x
a
1
2v3
(1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−
1
2
(1− z
v3
)−
1
2 (1− (1− a
v3
)
1
2 (1− z
v3
)
1
2 )dz
+(1− b− a
v2
)(1− a
v3
)−
1
2 (1− x
v3
)
1
2 − (1− b− a
v2
)(1− x
v3
)).
Solving the integral and rearranging, we obtain
(2v1 − v2)(1− (1− b− a
v2
)(1− x
v3
))− x+ (v2 − v3)
(
1
2
a2
v2v3
+ (1− b− a
v2
)
x
2v3
+ (1− b− a
v2
)
a
2v3
).
The expressions including x are
(2v1 − v2)(1− b− a
v2
)
x
v3
− x+ (v2 − v3)(1− b− a
v2
)
x
2v3
.
Using the identities from above, this expression vanishes and hence there is no x left in the
payoff equation
pi1(x) = (2v1 − v2)(1− (1− b− a
v2
)) + (v2 − v3)(1
2
a2
v2v3
+ (1− b− a
v2
)
a
v3
.
Finally, plugging in for F1 and F2, the payoff of player 3 simplifies to
pi3(x) = v3(1− (1− x
v3
))− x = 0.
We now consider the case 0 < x < a. Clearly, the payoff of players 2 and 3 is constant
on that interval and continuous at a. Thus, they have no profitable deviation from F2 and
F3, respectively.
For player 1, it remains to show that pi1(x) ≤ pi1(a).
The profit of player 1 is defined as
pi1(x) = (2v1 − v2)F3(x) + (2v1 − v3)F2(x)(1− F3(x))− x+ (v2 − v3)
∫ x
0
f3(z)F2(z)dz.
24
For all x < a, this reduces to
pi1(x) = (2v1 − v2)(b+ x
v2
) + (2v1 − v3)( x
v3
− bx
v3
− x
2
v2v3
)− x+ (v2 − v3) x
2
2v2v3
.
It suffices to show that pi′1(x) > 0 for all x < a. Taking the first derivative yields
pi′1(x) = (2v1 − v2)(
1
v2
) + (2v1 − v3)( 1
v3
− b
v3
− 2x
v2v3
)− 1 + (v2 − v3) x
v2v3
.
The first derivative is decreasing in x as pi′′1(x) = −(2v1 − v3)( 2v2v3 ) + (v2 − v3) 1v2v3 < 0.
Hence, pi′1(x) ≥ pi′1(a) for all x < a. It remains to show that pi′1(a) > 0. We plug in for a
and rewrite to obtain
pi′1(a) = (2v1 − v2)(
1
v2
+
1
v3
− b
v3
− 2a
v2v3
) + (v2 − v3)( 1
v3
− b
v3
− a
v2v3
)− 1.
Note that − b
v3
> −v2−v3
v2v3
and (2v1 − v2)(−2a) > −4v3(v1 − v2). Thus,
pi′1(a) > (2v1− v2)(
2
v2
)− 4v3(v1 − v2)
v2v3
+ (v2− v3)( 1
v2
− a
v2v3
)− 1 = 1 + (v2− v3)(v3 − a
v2v3
) > 1.
To sum up, the payoff of player 1 increases on the interval [0, a), is continuous at a and
constant on [a, v3]. Thus, player 1 has no profitable deviation from F1 given F2 and F3.
Finally, consider any of the possibly remaining players j > 3. Note that if j deviates
and qualifies for the second round, she will not receive any expected payoff as she will have
the lowest valuation. We define ρi(x) as the probability that player i wins a prize in Round
1 (and qualifies for Round 2) with a bid of x. Note that vj ≤ v3 and ρj(x) ≤ ρ3(x) in
equilibrium. Hence, pij(x) = vjρj(x)− x ≤ v3ρ3(x)− x ≤ 0. Therefore, bidding 0 is optimal
for player j.
Proof of Lemma 4. Step 1: F1(0) = F2(0) = 0.
If F1(0) = F2(0) > 0, then player 3 has F3(0) = 0, as bidding v3
F1(0)
3
yields a strictly
higher payoff than bidding zero. As F3(0) = 0, player 2 gets a strictly higher payoff by
bidding v3
F1(0)
3
than by bidding zero, a contradiction.
Step 2: x1 = x2 = x3 = 0.
Clearly, a player can secure a payoff of at least zero by bidding zero. Suppose no player
i has xi = 0. If Fi(x) > 0 for at least one player i, a player makes a strictly negative profit
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with a bid x, a contradiction to optimality. Otherwise, by continuity, there exists an  > 0
such that the same applies to every bid in an -neighborhood (x, x+ ).
Thus, at least one player has xi = 0. Suppose x3 = 0 and x1 = x2 > 0. By optimality
for player 3, he does not bid with probability in (0, x2). By the same argument as before,
at least one player would prefer to bid
x1
2
instead of x1 (or in (x1, x1 + )). Finally, suppose
x1 = x2 = 0 and x3 > 0. By continuity at 0, we have pi1 = pi2 = 0. By optimality, player 3
never bids above v3 and thus bidding v3 is a profitable deviation for player 1.
Step 3: pi3 = 0
Follows immediately as F1(0) = F2(0) = 0 and x3 = 0.
Step 4: x¯1 = x¯2 = x¯3 = v3.
First note that x¯1 = x¯2 = x¯3, since any player who has x¯i > minj x¯j could deviate by
bidding
x¯i+x¯j
2
otherwise. By the zero profit condition of player 3 (Step 3), we have x¯3 = v3.
Proof of Proposition 6. Note that the equilibrium in Clark and Riis (1998) directly extends
to include weak inequalities as long as vm+1 6= vm+2. Here, we have only 3 players and
m = 2 prizes, so this condition is satisfied. Plugging into their equilibrium construction,
the common upper support is v3. The lower support of player 3 is 0. Moreover, we have
x2 = [1 −
∏2
j=2(
vj
v2
)]v3 = 0. Recall that the expected profit of player 1 if she wins Round 1
is 2v1 − v3. Thus, we obtain x1 = [1− 2v1−v32v1−v3 v22v1−v3 ]v3 = v3(1− v32v1−v3 ). Plugging our values
into the distributions in Clark and Riis (1998) and rearranging gives the characterization in
the proposition.
To prove Proposition 7, we first need to derive the equilibrium in the static case.
Lemma 9 (Equilibrium in the Static Contest). Consider the static contest.
Case 1: If v1 = v2 ≥ 2v3 the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
F1(x) = F2(x) =

x
v1
for x ≤ v1
1 for x > v1,
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F3(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0.
Case 2: If v1 = v2 < 2v3, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
F1(x) = F2(x) =

x
2v3
for x ≤ 2v3
1 for x > 2v3,
and
F3(x) =

x(1− v1
2v3
)+2v1−2v3
v1
for x ≤ 2v3
1 for x > 2v3.
Case 3: If v1 > v2 = v3, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
F1(x) =

0 for x < 2v3(v1−v3)
2v1−v3
x
v3
− v1−v3+x2
v1
for 2v3(v1−v3)
2v1−v3 ≤ x ≤ 2v3
1 for x ≥ 2v3,
F2(x) = F3(x) =

x
v3
for x < 2v3(v1−v3)
2v1−v3
v1−v3+x2
v1
for 2v3(v1−v3)
2v1−v3 ≤ x ≤ 2v3
1 for x ≥ 2v3.
Proof. Xiao (2016) analyzes all-pay auctions with multiple prizes and derives an algorithm for
linear cost functions which can be used to determine the equilibrium under two assumptions,
called A.1 and A.2. Assumption A.2 restricts the form of the prizes. In particular, if the
difference between prizes 1 and 2 is the same as the difference between prizes 2 and 3 as we
assumed here, the sequence of prizes is called a quadratic prize sequence. This is a sufficient
condition to guarantee that Assumption A.2 holds.
Assumption A.1 says the marginal cost should be ordered, which is equivalent to our
condition of constant ordering of valuations in Section 4 up to the fact that we allow for
equal valuations. The construction of the unique equilibrium in Xiao (2016) extends for
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equal valuations and there may only be other additional equilibria when vm+1 = vm+2.
8
Since this is not the case here, the equilibrium in the static model is unique and we can use
Xiao’s algorithm to obtain it. We provide the details in the appendix. This allows us to
compare the total expected effort in the static and the two-stage contest.
Uniqueness follows from directly from Xiao (2016). Existence is straightforward to verify
by checking that the payoffs of each player are constant on the respective support and lower
for every other bid. We omit the straightforward calculations, but give an intuition for the
different cases below.
In the first case v1 = v2 ≥ 2v3, players 1 and 2 compete for the first prize, but are
guaranteed the second prize since player 3 is inactive. The difference between first and
second is v1, the endpoint of the supports. Player 3 has such a low valuation that given the
bids of players 1 and 2, any positive bid would yield a (weakly) negative payoff. Thus, he
abstains from bidding.
In the second case, we still have two strong bidders, but the valuation of the weak bidder
is relatively higher. Thus, player 3 randomizes on a common interval with players 1 and 2,
but also places probability mass at zero. Finally, in the case of two weak bidders, all three
bidders randomize with positive probability on the same interval.
Proof of Proposition 7. Using Lemma 9, we can compare the static contest to the two-stage
contests.
Calculation of total expected effort:
For two equally strong contestants, we have the effort distributions in the Nash equilib-
rium of the static contest and in the (symmetric and monotone) subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the two-stage contest. This allows us to derive the total expected effort in each contest.
Consider the static game.
8This extends the reasoning of Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) for the case of one prize and at least
three players where v2 = v3.
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(i): If v1 = v2 ≥ 2v3, contestant 3 remains inactive. Thus, we have
TE = 2
∫ v1
0
f1(x)xdx = v1.
(ii): If v1 = v2 < 2v3, contestant 3 is active. For the total effort, we obtain
TE = 2
∫ 2v3
0
f1(x)xdx+
∫ 2v3
0
f3(x)xdx = v3 +
2v23
v1
.
(iii): If v1 > v2 = v3, contestant 3 is active. We have
TE =
∫ v3
2v3(v1−v3)
2v1−v3
f1(x)xdx+ 2
∫ v3
0
f3(x)xdx = 2v3 +
v1v3
2v1 − v3 .
Consider the two-stage contest.
(a): Let us first consider the case v1 = v2 > v3. The total effort is given by
TE = 2
∫ v3
0
f1(x)xdx+
∫ v3
0
f3(x)xdx+
v23
2v1
+
v3
2
+(v1 − ( v
2
3
2v1
+
v3
2
))(F3(0) +
∫ v3
0
f3(x)(1− F1(x))2dx). (3)
The first two terms in Eq. (3) are the expected efforts exerted in Round 1. By the
construction in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996), the expected effort in Round 2 is
v3
2
+
v23
2v1
if player 3 qualifies and v1 >
v3
2
+
v23
2v1
if player 3 does not qualify. Thus, the expected
efforts in Round 2 are v3
2
+
v23
2v1
plus v1 − v32 + v
2
3
2v1
whenever player 3 does not qualify which
explains the remaining terms in Eq. (3). The equation can be simplified to
TE = v1 +
4v3
3
+
2v23
3v1 − v3 −
4v1v3
9v1 − 3v3 +
2v33
v1(9v1 − 3v3) .
Putting everything on a common denominator, we obtain the equation in the proposition.
(b): Let us now consider the case v1 > v2 = v3. The calculation of total effort is similar to
the first case:
TE =
∫ v3
0
xf1(x)dx+ 2
∫ v3
0
xf3(x)dx+ v3 + (
v23
2v1
− v3
2
)
∫ v3
0
f1(x)(2F3(x)− (F3(x))2)dx.
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This can be calculated as
TE =
v33
6(2v1 − v3)2 +
v23
3v1
+
5v3
2
.
Comparison of total expected effort:
Denote the difference between the total effort in the two-stage contest and the total effort
in the corresponding static contest by ∆. We have to show that ∆ > 0 for all considered
parameters. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: Suppose v1 = v2 ≥ 2v3. We obtain
∆(v1, v3) =
9v31 + 5v
2
1v3 + 2v1v
2
3 + 2v
3
3
3v1(3v1 − v3) − v1 =
2v3(4v
2
1 + v1v3 + v
2
3)
3v1(3v1 − v3) > 0.
Case 2: v1 = v2 < 2v3. We obtain
∆(v1, v3) =
9v31 + 5v
2
1v3 + 2v1v
2
3 + 2v
3
3
3v1(3v1 − v3) − v3 −
2v23
v1
=
9v31 − 4v21v3 − 13v1v23 + 8v33
3v1(3v1 − v3) .
Thus, it suffices to show that the numerator ∆num = 9v
3
1 − 4v21v3 − 13v1v23 + 8v33 is pos-
itive. At v1 = v3, we have ∆num = 0. Moreover, note that the derivative
d∆num
dv1
=
27v21 − 8v1v3 − 13v23 ≥ 6v21 > 0 for all v3 such that v1 ≥ v3 > 0. Thus, since v1 > v3,
we obtain ∆(v1, v3) > ∆(v1, v1) = 0.
Case 3: Suppose v1 > v2 = v3. We obtain
∆(v1, v3) =
v33
6(2v1 − v3)2 +
v23
3v1
+
5v3
2
− 2v3 − v1v3
2v1 − v3 =
v3(v1 − v3)2
3v1(2v1 − v3)2 > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 8. Let us first consider the case v1 = v2 > v3. Using the result in Clark
and Riis (1998), the effort distributions (on the interval (0, v3)) in Round 1 are given by
F1(x) = F2(x) = 1− (1− xv3 )0.5 and F3(x) = 1− v3v1 (1− xv3 )0.5.
Note that F1(x) and F2(x) are identical to the case with announcement. For F3(x),
we have that − 2v3
3v1−v3 > −v3v1 . Thus, player 3’s distribution function with announcement is
stochastically dominated by his distribution for the case without announcement. Clearly,
this increases the probability that player 3 is eliminated in Round 1 and thereby increases
the probability that a strong player wins in Round 2.
The total effort without announcement is given by TE = 4
3
v3 +
2
3
v23
v1
+v1− 23v3 + v
2
3
3v1
+
v33
3v21
.
A comparison to the case with announcement shows the total effort is larger by announc-
ing if v3 <
170.5−3
2
v1.
It remains to consider the case v1 = v2 > v3. Using the result in Clark and Riis (1998),
the effort distributions in Round 1 are given by
F1(x) =

0 for x < v3(1− v3v1 )
1− (v1
v3
)0.5(1− x
v3
)0.5 for x ∈ [v3(1− v3v1 ), v3]
1 for x > v3 ,
F2(x) = F3(x) =

x
v3
for x < v3(1− v3v1 )
1− (v3
v1
)0.5(1− x
v3
)0.5 for x ∈ [v3(1− v3v1 ), v3]
1 for x > v3 .
The probability that player 1 qualifies is thus 1 − v23
3v21
, i.e., lower than in the case with
announcement.
Expected total effort equals TE = 1
6
v3(
v23(3v1−v3)
v31
+ v3
v1
+ 15).
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The calculation shows that TE is higher by announcing if
v3 < (2− (9−
√
78)
1
3
3
2
3
− 1
3(9−√78) 13 )v1.
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